

REBALANCING EUROPE'S GAS SUPPLY OPPORTUNITIES IN A NEW ERA

Co-sponsors



Technical input from





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The study

- EU calls for phase out of coal, oil, gas supplies from Russia as soon as possible; and Russia threatens to stop supplies
- IOGP Europe and American Petroleum Institute co-funded study by Rystad Energy in collaboration with ENTSO-G and GIE
 - > Unique study capturing detailed input from market parties along the full value chain
- Study scope covers supplies to Europe (EU27 plus UK, NO, UA, CH, Balkan) in 2023 2040
- Study assesses ...
 - annual and peak-day demand / supply balances (including by region)
 - > infrastructure capabilities
 - > supply sources available to Europe in short and longer term, and their cost of supply
- Study uses on EU demand forecasts (EU pre-FF55 Baseline and FF55 Mix net-zero scenario);
 no analysis of demand reducing effects from crisis
- Building on the study, Rystad Energy together with IOGP, API and input from ENTSOG, GIE developed policy consideration which support the fast and effective rebalancing of supplies
- Separate studies confirm significant need for gas supplies to Europe to enable cost-efficient scale-up of low carbon hydrogen production using CCUS to achieve net-zero objectives
- Supply cost and price assessments are exclusively developed by Rystad Energy and were not discussed as part of the study

Presentation overview


- Needed background information
- Key results
 - Annual European demand / supply balances until 2040 with and without Russia
 - Regionalization of Europe's demand / supply balances
 - Infrastructure capabilities
- LNG deep dive
- Conclusions
- Policy recommendations





NEEDED BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Study assumes demand reductions from 520 bcm to 260 or 340 bcm by 2040




*EU and UK forecasts have 2030 and 2050 data points only; linear extrapolation used between data points **Norway, Albania, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Switzerland, Ukraine Source: Rystad Energy research and analysis, Rystad Energy GasMarketCube, European Commission, UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy



Europe and Asia compete for LNG supplies from global sources


Global natural gas balances 2011-2021




Source: Rystad Energy research and analysis; Rystad Energy GasMarketCube



Global LNG market growing to 900 bcm/a with N America becoming largest supplier; limited volumes (~200 bcm) available for short-term (spot) contracting





^{*}US LNG FOB potential treated as spot LNG under a high gas regime – treated as long term contracts and therefore unavailable upon assumed stabilizing market prices from 2027 onwards. **Includes incremental European demand. Source: GasMarketCube, Rystad Energy research and analyses

The study groups supplies by source, increment and timing

Gas source	Increment group	Timing	Full resource potential 2022-2040 BCM		Comment
Domestic	Base	Both	2099		Domestic resources connected to the European demand via pipelines Includes reserves in key fields such as Troll, Ormen Lange and Culzean
	Increment contingent	Long term	653		Includes all domestic resources not yet sanctioned for development Numerous small and low cost developments that benefit from existing infrastructure
	Increment exploration		150	•	Exploration expected to yield limited potential given the mature nature of the domestic hydrocarbon basins
Special domestic increment	Troll max	Short term	32.9	•	Short term potential in maximizing the Troll field output according to 2021 levels
	Higher GCV		23.6	•	Volume equivalent impact of increasing energy content in gas export
	Groningen		382	•	Key short term domestic production increment, should the politically guided curtailment be reversed
	Barents pipe		144		Key long term domestic production increment Connects resources in the Barents Sea to the existing Norwegian pipeline network
	European shale	Long term	455	•	Possible to produce 30 Bcm/yr from 2027, however politically sensitive
	Europe piped gas imports	Both	564	•	Expected minimum imports from North Africa (Algeria and Libya) and Azerbaijan
Discourse	Algeria increase	Ch aut taus	606	:	Potential increase in Algerian exports, should gas be marketed instead of reinjected Export increase has been staggered to capture increasing marginal cost
Piped gas	Turkey pass- through	Short term	89.5	•	Potential re-routing of Turkey's share of TANAP gas from Azerbaijan Export increase has been staggered to capture increasing marginal cost
	TR/Azerbaijan expansion	Long term	387		Long term expansions of the TANAP/TAP infrastructure Includes multiple phases which have been staggered to capture increasing marginal cost
LNG	LT Contracted	Both	858	•	All known LNG contracts with Europe as destination
	Spot/FOB LNG	Short term	1522	•	Maximum potential of spot and US LNG FOB imports The market will be shared with Asia and 100% market share is therefore unlikely
	Available for LT contracts	Long term	7863	•	The global pool of expected long term LNG production to meet global LNG demand Europe will be able to capture a market share of this vast potential

^{*}Full resource potential is based on resources that are already producing or under development Source: Rystad Energy research and analysis




The study ranks supplies by earliest availability and cost of supply

Timing	Increment grouping	Indicative combined political and economic cost of supply EUR/MWh	Cost increase		Comment
	Base				Lowest cost supply
Both	Europe piped gas imports	Low			Base cost of supply from Algeria, Libya and Azerbaijan
	Long-term LNG imports				Contracted gas
	Algeria sustained until 2026 at 2021	Medium			Behavior observed in 2021 hence reasonable cost of supply
	Troll max	Medidili		term	Maximum utilisation of the Troll field
Short term	TR pass-through (10-40% of TANAP)	Lliah		Short term	Possible reroute as a function of high prices and expanded Turkish LNG import capacity
	Higher GCV	High		o)	Behavior observed in 2022 at high gas price levels- higher gross calorific content of gas
	LNG spot market	130			Defined ceiling of what market share of spot LNG will be acquired by Europe (approx. 40USD/Mmbtu)
	Groningen	Last resort			Viewed as last resort gas supply only called upon if all other sources are exhaused including pushing LNG up to its ceiling
	Algeria 75% Marketed	Too biah			Too expensive to be considered, demand will decline before the increment is called upon
	TR pass-through (70% of TANAP)	Too high			Too expensive to be considered, demand will decline before the increment is called upon
	Increment contingent and exploration				Contingent resources around Europe and exploration efforts competitive vs long term LNG
	TANAP/TAP expansion Phase 1	Lower			Possible pipe expansion project that may be competitive with long term LNG
	Barents pipe			E	Possible pipe expansion project that may be competitive with long term LNG
Long term	Long term LNG	30		Long term	Key number, long term LNG expected to cost around 9 USD/Mmbtu on the back of vasts low cost gas in the US
	European shale gas			ĭ	European shale gas resources, considered too politically challenging to be monetized. See appendix
	TANAP/TAP expansion Phase 2&3	Too high			Considered too high cost vs long term LNG
	Algeria sustained until 2040 at 2021				Considered too high cost vs long term LNG




KEY RESULTS


Domestic supplies important but challenged by resource potential, political environment




Moderate maximization of domestic supplies possible




Russian piped gas supply assumed to reduce by 2/3 as of 2023 and cease in 2027




Non-Russian other pipeline imports to Europe contribute about 10% of overall supplies



LNG is a crucial market balancing factor for Europe, both in the short and long-term



Ranking supplies by cost of supply filters out high-cost LNG, pipeline imports, politically challenged gas




Source: Rystad Energy research and analysis, Rystad Energy GasMarketCube, European Commission, UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy



WHAT IS THE SUPPLY GAP IF RUSSIA STOPS SUPPLIES?


No Russian supplies as of 2023 creates supply gap in 2023 - 2025 but ...



Source: Rystad Energy research and analysis, Rystad Energy GasMarketCube, European Commission, UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy

Supply gap versus 2017-2021 average demand: gap of up to 19%

Short-term supply with high-cost / non-affordable gas filtered out, and without Russia from 2023




Source: Rystad Energy research and analysis, Rystad Energy GasMarketCube, European Commission, UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy






REGIONALIZATION


Regional grouping of countries which are relatively well connected by infrastructure




Non-Russian pipeline imports from North Sea, N Africa, and Turkey



Significant LNG regas capacity into Europe; interconnecting regions through rerouting




Connectivity between regions varies with significant bottlenecks between Spain and France; Poland and Lithuania and no capacity for reverse flows from Italy to Greece



Without Russian gas in 2023: while interconnectors/LNG reroute can shift supplies, N&C Europe, Italy, S/E Europe compete for globally remaining affordable supplies

Regional balances, 2023 (unit: bcm/year)




^{*}N&C Europe treated as a region of residual uncontracted LNG **Norwegian exports assumed flexible and maximised up to capacity ***Contractual obligations respected Source: Rystad Energy research and analysis, Rystad Energy GasMarketCube, European Commission, UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, ENTSOG






INFRASTRUCTURE CAPABILITIES

Europe has significant gas infrastructure capacity to supply peak day demand








Regional infrastructures sufficient to supply peak day demand but storages need to be appropriately filled (some bottlenecks within regions to be addressed)

Regional balances with peak day supply capacity of infrastructure, 2023 (unit: bcm/day)



Assumptions: pipeline import capacities capped by export country supply availability; Bottlenecks within regions not considered; Ukraine storage excluded. Source: Rystad Energy research and analysis, Rystad Energy GasMarketCube, European Commission, UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, ENTSOG






DEEP DIVE ON LNG

N America could supply new European LNG long-term requirements


North American LNG exports capacity vs European LNG imports requirement





Low-cost supplies in N America; new European demand ~7% production increase


US and Canada natural gas supply potential by lifecycle and breakeven price



Note: Breakeven based on a 7.5% real hurdle rate. Prices are in real terms. Assumed exchange rate: 1 EUR = 1.02 USD Source: Rystad Energy GasMarketCube




Long-term European LNG supply cost expectations compare with pre-crisis levels once market distressed



Prices are in real terms. Assumed exchange rate: 1 EUR = 1.02 USD Source: Rystad Energy research and analysis

LNG carrier fleet expected to handle more LNG trade


Forecast of the global LNG carrier market




^{*}Short-term forecast of vessel capacity based on public order-books of LNG vessels. Long-term forecast based on historic growth rates of vessel supply. **Thousand nautical miles. Source: Rystad Energy research and analysis; IGU World LNG Report 2022



European LNG regas/import capacity can grow by 120 bcm to 330 bcm per year





Source: Rystad Energy research and analysis; Rystad Energy GasMarketCube

New regas terminals will enable rebalancing in challenged European regions and increase future market resilience

Future LNG regasification capacity in Europe between 2022 and 2040

Country	Plant name	Capacity Mtpa	
Albania	Albania LNG terminal (Port of Vlora)	2.5	
Belgium	Zeebrugge 2 Expansion Step 1	4.7	ICELAND
Belgium	Zeebrugge 2 Expansion Step 2	1.3	
Cyprus	Cyprus FSRU	0.6	
Estonia	Paldiski LNG	1.8	NORWAY FINLAND
Finland	Hamina FSRU	3.7	RUSSIA
Finland	Hamina LNG	0.6	4
France	Fos Cavaou 2	6.2	• ESTONIA
Germany	Brunsbuettel LNG Terminal	5.9	LATVIA
Germany	Rostock LNG	6.0	DENMARK • 15
Germany	Stade LNG	9.8	22 BELARUS
Germany	Wilhelmshaven FSRU	7.4	IRELAND 16 10 7 9
Greece	Alexandroupolis LNG	4.0	
Greece	Argo FSRU	3.4	BELGIUM GERMANT CZECH Capacity: 5.4mtp
Greece	Thrace INGS FSRU	4.0	LUXEMBOURG REPUBLIC SLOVAKIA MOLDOV
Italy	ENI FSRU, location pending	3.7	AUSTRIA HUNGARY
Italy	FSRU near Sardinia	3.7	
Lithuania	Klaipedos Nafta FSRU 2	3.0	BOSNIAAND HERZEGOVINA SERBIA
Netherlands	Eemshaven FSRU	5.9	KOSOVO BULGARIA MONTENEGRO NORTH
Netherlands	Gate LNG terminal (LNG Rotterdam) expansion 1	1.1	SPAIN TURKEY
Netherlands	Gate LNG terminal (LNG Rotterdam) expansion 2	4.8	PORTUGAL SPAIN ALBANIA 12 GREECE GREECE
Poland	Gaz-System Gdansk FSRU	3.2	
Poland	Swinoujscie	4.3	CYPP 3
Slovakia	Bratislava LNG terminal	0.6	MOROCCO ALGERIA TUNISIA 0 200 400
₩ United Kingdom	Port Meridian LNG	5.0	
United Kingdom	Teesside GasPort - Trafigura	5.5	construction Existing terminal

^{*}The Turkish Gulf of Saros FSRU has been added despite Turkey being out of the study's scope as the investment may provide additional supply to southeast Europe Source: Rystad Energy research and analysis; Rystad Energy GasMarketCube





CONCLUSIONS

Conclusions

- 2023-2025 it will be progressively possible to substitute the 150 Bcm/a Russian supplies thanks to alternative sources, a mostly integrated European market, and interconnected infrastructure able to handle new flow patterns; thereby high prices significantly contribute to the market balancing by ...
 - attracting spot LNG cargoes to Europe's LNG terminals in competition with demand in Asia (increasing LNG supplies from 100 Bcm in 2021 to 160 Bcm in 2023, i.e. plus 60 Bcm),
 - incentivizing full production from existing fields in Europe (despite decline) and maximizing imports from Algeria and other neighbouring regions (increasing supplies from 280 Bcm in 2021 to 300 Bcm in 2023, i.e. plus 20 Bcm),
 - reducing demand: e.g. a 15% reduction vs. prior years reduces Europe's demand by 75 Bcm (balances market),
 - accelerating the transition to renewable energies (though with limited short-term impact due to lead times),
 - but high prices have severe impacts suggesting targeted support especially to vulnerable consumers while avoiding unintended consequences from market interventions
- Infrastructure can mostly handle new flow patterns and supply peak-day demand if storages appropriately filled; some regions compete for globally remaining affordable gas supplies
- Starting 2026, with the right decisions now and political support, new long-term supplies from an abundance of low-cost global resources can fully substitute Russian supplies and result in pre-crisis price expectation levels
 - While supplies from Europe's domestic resources and its neighbours are declining, LNG imports from an abundance of global resources can balance Europe's market
 - ➤ Despite assumed 35% demand reduction by 2040 (EU pre-FF55 Baseline Scenario), new LNG imports in order of 200 Bcm/year needed until and beyond 2040



POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Policy considerations – European production

- Reassess potential of natural gas production in Europe including from shale gas resources with the aim to maximize domestic production in compatibility with Green Deal; production in Europe ...
 - supports Europe's gas supply diversity and energy security,
 - > creates economic activity, significant fiscal revenues, job opportunities in a highly skilled sector,
 - has comparably low GHG emissions footprint (produced based on mature framework near the market),
 - can be produced while achieving net-zero objectives without lock-in effects (replaces imported gas and reforming it into hydrogen with CCUS enables it to fuel Europe's energy needs with near zero emissions at relatively low cost)
- Member States should review their contribution to increasing domestic production and include production plans in the revisions to National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs)
 - Reconsider bans, moratoria or limitations on E&P activities and the deployment of fracking technology
 - Review designated no-go areas under existing mining laws
 - Accelerate permitting procedures and related impact assessments
- Recognize significant role of Norway as reliable supplier and further deepen EU's partnership
 - Possibly exempt Barents Sea resource developments from Arctic Resources Directive (environmental conditions in Barents Sea are similar with the North Sea rather than with other Arctic areas)

Policy considerations – New imports

- EU partnerships with producer countries can support new supplies but contracts should be concluded between market parties in competition with each other
 - Imports via pipelines from other EU neighbouring regions can benefit from targeted policy support (e.g. TANAP/TAP expansions)
- Long-term LNG purchase and infrastructure-use contracts need to be supported by an appropriate legal framework underpinning the financing and de-risking of the significant investments needed
 - > TPA rule exemptions facilitate investments into new/incremental infrastructure
 - Accelerate LNG FSRU permitting procedures
 - Reassess sunset clause for long-term natural gas contracts
- Missing North America midstream infrastructure (pipeline capacity, liquefaction) is a bottleneck to fully enable LNG exports to Europe
 - Permitting issues to be addressed in US and Canada; EU awareness and support important
 - Ongoing API study on need for expansion of midstream pipelines to transport gas to LNG liquefaction
- Recognize relevance of demand forecasts / energy policy objectives for investors into new supplies

Policy considerations – Infrastructure

- Integrated market with well interconnected infrastructure significantly contributing to resilience of European gas market and should be preserved being a key enabler of its fast rebalancing
- With East-West flows disappearing, former transit countries have spare capacities while new bottlenecks for new West-East flows need to be addressed to increase system resilience
 - Gas projects in REPowerEU chapters of the Recovery and Resilience Plans address key infrastructure needs (without leading to lock-in effects and stranded assets)
 - Coordination role for Commission for transmission corridors across several member states
 - Gas de-odorization of flows from France to Germany is key issues to be addressed
- Nearly sufficient alternative natural gas import capacities exist
 - Selected infrastructure expansions and new LNG regas terminals especially in N/Central and S/E Europe create additional system resilience
 - Consider establishing a short-term / emergency Projects of Common Interest instrument to support necessary EU network, LNG regas, and storage reinforcements
- Policy makers to carefully reassess forecast gas demand reductions and infrastructure downsizing with aim to ensure security of supply
 - Hydrogen-ready infrastructure contributes to diversify gas supply in the internal market and help tap into the long-term potential for hydrogen

Limited investments to address bottlenecks, increase supply options and system resilience

Recommendations from European Transmission System Operators and European Commission

- Some new LNG regas terminals and related transmission system connections needed to replace Russian supplies, increase system resilience
 - > LNG regas in Northern Germany; Baltics / Poland (Gdansk), Croatia (Krk)
- Some interconnector expansions / extensions further increase regional supply options:
 - > Spain to France: increase N/C Europe access to Spain's LNG regas as alternative to cargo redirections
 - Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, towards Greece
 - Turkey to Bulgaria and Bulgaria to Greece
- Some intra-regional transmission bottlenecks to be addressed to enable / support new flow patterns
 - France to Germany transmission capacity debottlenecking needed including addressing issue of odorized gas preempting gas flows due to German industry consumer concerns about sulfur content
 - Reinforce Italian transmission system for increased South to North flows from TAP and N Africa
- Increase storage capacity in Latvia (Incukalns) to enhance supply capacity for peak demand



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